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At least 130,000 people have been killed in 
the ongoing Mexican “crime war,” and many 
more have been kidnapped or simply gone 
missing.1 Yet despite the signifi cance of these 
numbers, offi cial reports and news accounts 
frequently underreport the toll of this war.




Iraqi Security Police investigate a destroyed car used as a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive 
Device (VBIED) in which both occupants died. Photo by: Tsgt Roy Santana
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By Robert J. Bunker and John Sullivan
                       exican cartels and 
                        gangsters clearly 
use violence to further their business 
interests.  reats and violence ward o  
competition and discourage interference 
with illegal drug transshipment points 
(plazas) and distribution nodes.  e 
cartels have also directly confronted 
Mexico’s government, leading to a 
crisis of state solvency (the net result 
of capacity and legitimacy) that can be 
characterized as “criminal insurgency.”2
So far, the majority of cartel actions 
have involved small arms—such as 
the classic cuerno de chivo (AK-47). 
Mass shootings, grenade attacks, 
dismemberments, beheadings, and 
blockades (narcobloqueos) are also 
common tactics. Additional weapons 
employed by cartels include both 
improvised armored  ghting vehicles 
known as narcotanques and car bombings 
(coches bomba). In fact, use of car bombs 
or VBIEDs (vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive devices) is a tactic that has 
been employed with varying frequency 
throughout the con ict. 
M
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an ambush on the Federal Police.3  e 
last major VBIED attack of this period 
occurred on 31 July 2012 in Culiacán, 
Sinaloa. Other isolated VBIED-related 
incidents have taken place outside of this 
period, however. For example, on 14 July 
2008 in Culiacán, Sinaloa, two explosive 
devices integrated with gas cylinders (in 
an attempt to enhance lethality) were 
discovered in a vehicle at a cartel safe 
house.
CARTEL VBIED USE IN 
MEXICO
VBIEDs have been employed in several 
attacks by cartels in Mexico, with the 
majority of these incidents occurring 
between July 2010 and July 2012.  e 
 rst widely reported contemporary 
Mexican car bombing occurred in 
embattled Ciudad Juárez on  ursday, 
15 July 2010, with four people killed in 
Sinaloa Cartel o  cer Javier Torres Felix is deported to Mexico after completing his sentence in the U.S. He was immediately arrested in Mexico 
for pending charges in his homeland. Photo by: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
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In our monograph Cartel Car Bombings 
in Mexico, we tracked 20 VBIED 
incidents between 2010 and 2012. Two 
of these incidents involved multiple 
devices (one in 2011 with two car bombs, 
and one in 2012 with two vehicle-borne 
incendiary devices).4   e Mexican 
attorney general or PGR (Procuradura 
General de la República) reported 16 
car bomb incidents for the 2010-2012 
timeframe.5 Use of VBIEDs has virtually 
stopped since that sequence.  e only 
reported incident since our analysis of 
the 2010-2012 incidents was an alleged 
CNG (El Cártel Nueva Generación) car 
bomb—actually an improvised incendiary 
device accompanied by a narcomanta 
(narco-banner)—detonated outside the 
Reclusorio Oriente correctional facility in 
Distrito Federal, Mexico City.6
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A glimpse into the construction of 
one of these devices is available in a 
Mexican Cartel Tactical Note focusing 
on a VBIED recovered in January 2012. 
 is particular VBIED was meant for 
detonation next to a police station in 
Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas, but was 
seized before it could be employed. 
Photos of the device, hidden in the trunk 
of a vehicle, were utilized for forensic 
purposes; however, due to poor photo 
quality, only a limited analysis was 
conducted.7
A limited number of 60mm mortar 
rounds, claymore mines, and numerous 
RPG rounds have been recovered in 
Mexico. To date, none of these munitions 
have been reported incorporated into 
VBIEDs. Conceivably, hand and ri e 
grenades—both older muzzle-launched 
forms and modern launched variants—
could be bundled together for boosting 
purposes, along with gasoline and other 
highly  ammable fuels (such as that 
found in the July 2008 VBIED incident), 




 reats and Warnings: Cartel VBIEDs 
have been primarily utilized against 
Mexican military and police personnel, 
the media, and businesses to encourage or 
discourage certain behavior.  e intent is 
to both threaten and warn against taking 
particular actions, in order to motivate a 
shift to activities more favorable to cartel 
policies and desires. Examples include 
warning military personnel away from 
cracking down on a speci c cartel or 
threatening a newspaper from reporting 
on a cartel leader’s activities. In numerous 
incidents in which VBIEDs were left 
outside facilities, the detonations resulted 
VBIED DESIGN AND 
CONSTRUCTION
 e VBIEDs employed by Mexican 
cartels have generally been low-yield 
devices—more “bombs in cars” than 
higher-yield devices that take advantage 
of the volume of explosives that a vehicle 
(especially a van or larger truck) can 
accommodate. Accurate information 
on the design and construction of 
these devices is limited. Payload sizes 
encountered have been in the 10- and 
16-kilogram range. Types of explosives 
utilized include Tovex (a mining 
explosive), dynamite, and C-4. Electric 
detonation systems are typically triggered 
via cell phone activation; however, a 
Futaba radio controller has also been 
recovered.  e cartels are also known to 
possess detonation cord.
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in no causalities; however, the implicit 
threat of what would happen if unwanted 
behaviors continued was made clear.
Psychological Warfare/Terrorism: Implicit 
in the above threats and warnings dynamic 
is the use of psychological warfare (and 
terrorism) principles to generate fear, 
terror, and the ambiguity of not knowing 
when or if an attack might come.  e 
creation of an ever-present feeling of 
imperilment induces high levels of stress. 
VBIED employment patterns represent 
another cartel capability in addition 
to the use of direct assaults, snipers, 
kidnapping, and torture to terrorize 
and resocialize populations. VBIED 
employment against a police headquarters 
building in April 2012, a city hall in 
June 2012, and the private residence of 
a chief security o  cer in July 2012—all 
in the state of Tamaulipas—represents 
an ongoing campaign to terrorize public 
o  cials so they become compliant with 
cartel control.
Diversion: Here, a VBIED or 
incendiary device is detonated to draw 
a police or security response and thus 
distract responders from another attack. 
 is creation of a diversion is similar to 
the use of narcobloqueos (narco-blockades) 
to channelize maneuver options and 
is essentially an anti-maneuver tactic. 
Narcobloqueos typically involve large 
trucks or buses and frequently include 
tanker trucks that are set ablaze to 
complicate response.8
Anti-Personnel Targeting:  is targeting 
theme can be seen in both the initial 
July 2010 Ciudad Juárez bombing, 
which drew in unsuspecting police and 
responder personnel, and later in the 
much more sophisticated attack in Nuevo 
Laredo, Tamaulipas, on 24 May 2012. 
In that incident, police personnel at a 
Anti-Vehicular/Anti-Materiel Targeting: 
In an incident in Monterrey, Nuevo 
Leon, on 20 October 2011, a Mexican 
military convoy was drawn into an 
ambush in which a parked car on the 
side of a road was detonated. Because 
none of the vehicles in the passing 
convoy were damaged, it is not known 
makeshift barracks at the Hotel Santa 
Cecilia—a small L-shaped motel—were 
targeted. Gun re directed at the motel 
drew them out of their rooms into the 
parking lot. A small device was then 
detonated in the back of a pickup truck 
next to the motel. Eight o  cers and two 
civilians were wounded as a result. 
A simulated VBIED at the National Training Center (NTC). 
Photo by: Master Sgt. Johancharles Van Boers 
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whether the low-yield VBIED detonated 
prematurely and/or did not function 
properly or whether this attack was 
meant as only a threats and warnings 
incident.2 In another incident, albeit a 
quasi-VBIED one, in Ciudad Victoria, 
Tamaulipas, on 6 June 2012, two vehicles 
at a car dealership were targeted. In what 
appeared to be an extortion plot, the gas 
tanks of the vehicles were ignited either 




VBIEDS can be used in more 
destructive employment pro les than 
those described above. To date, Mexican 
cartel use of VBIEDs has been far more 
constrained than use of these devices by 
contemporary al-Qaeda-linked groups, as 
well as the bombings carried out by both 
Hezbollah and Colombian cartels during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. VBIED 
patterns not demonstrated in Mexico 
include the following:
Mass/Indiscriminate Killing: VBIED 
casualty  gures in Mexico have been 
low, with one incident resulting in four 
deaths, another in two deaths, and a 
further incident in one death. Upper 
totals for injuries have been seven in 
two incidents and three in three others. 
Numerous incidents have yielded no 
deaths or injuries. By comparison, the 
highest fatality- and injury-producing 
cartel incident utilizing an explosive 
device was a September 2008 grenade 
attack in the main square of Morelia, 
Michoacán, during a festival. In that 
incident, detonation of multiple 
fragmentation grenades resulted in eight 
deaths and over 100 injuries.
Anti-Infrastructure Targeting: 
There is currently no evidence that 
purposeful anti-infrastructure attacks 
utilizing VBIEDs—with the intent of 
destroying buildings or other forms 
of infrastructure—have taken place in 
Mexico.  e most similar style incident 
would be the use of arson by a gang of 
gunmen against the Casino Royale in 
Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, resulting in 52 
deaths and over a dozen injuries. To place 
this in context regarding upper casualty 
thresholds, the most devastating cartel 
VBIED attack of all time was an incident 
involving a security building in Medellin, 
The creation of an 
ever-present feeling of 
imperilment induces 
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Colombia, in December 1989. In that 
attack, a 500-kilogram VBIED was 
detonated, killing 59 people and injuring 
1,000.  is was one of the largest 
VBIEDs to be employed in the Western 
Hemisphere.
Suicide/Martyrdom Operations: As of 
September 2013, no evidence has been 
reported of a car or truck driver engaging, 
or even attempting to engage, in a suicide 
or martyrdom-style operation using a 
VBIED in Mexico.  e most similar 
incident may be that of the July 2010 
Ciudad Juárez bombing, in which a 
bound and wounded man was dressed as 
a police o  cer and used as an unwilling 
decoy in a “bait and wait” trap to kill 
Mexican police and  rst responders.9
PRESENT AND FUTURE 
USE
VBIED use by Mexican organized 
crime cartels has been dormant 
since August 2012, after sustained 
multiyear employment beginning 
in July 2010.  e reasons for 
this “strategic pause” in VBIED 
use are unknown. Strangely, the 
pause correlates with the Mexican 
presidential elections at the end 
of July 2012 and the subsequent 
victory of Enrique Peña Nieto, the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(PRI) candidate. Also interesting, an 
earlier period of limited cartel VBIED 
employment existed in the early 
1990s. During that period, VBIEDs 
A Blackwater MD-530 responds to a VBIED in Baghdad, Iraq. 
Photo by Master Sgt. Michael E. Best
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 at is, VBIEDs become more valuable 
when seeking to manipulate mass opinion 
during a campaign to secure control of 
turf or a contested plaza. Other tools 
(such as grenades or individual armed 
assaults) are better suited to tactical 
engagements or retaliation for individual 
transgressions against the cartel.
Although the religious fervor of the 
Knights Templar (Cabelleros Templarios) 
cartel in Michoacán may at  rst 
glance raise the possibility of potential 
martyrdom operations (involving vehicle- 
or person-borne devices), such attacks 
may not be likely.  e instrumental 
violence of the drug wars originates in 
local contexts, not in the context of global 
jihad. Furthermore, narcocultura exploits 
religious imagery to sustain images of 
social bandits, not religious martyrs. San 
Nazario is a venerated icon of innate 
rebellion, but the local context does not 
mirror the Middle East. Beheadings are 
used to dehumanize adversaries, not 
mimic jihadis. Likewise, VBIEDs in 
Mexico must be viewed in the context of 
the Mexican criminal insurgency and not 
forced to mirror global jihad imagery that 
does not  t.
were used by the cartels against one 
another, rather than against governmental 
security personnel, the press, and 
businesses.
A cartel’s selection of tactics is 
driven by the environment. Although 
Mexico’s cartels have the capability (both 
knowledge and materials) to conduct 
Truck bomb in Cali, Colombia, August 2006. Photo by: Segan
VBIED attacks, they apparently do not 
have need for such attacks at the present 
time.  ey are able to achieve desired 
results by use of other tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs). Both sophisticated 
and simple variants of VBIEDs—i.e., both 
car bombs and “bombs in cars”—are better 
used when seeking to shape strategic space. 
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VBIED spillover from the Mexican 
confl ict into the United States is a 
possibility. Current probabilities are 
low—especially since VBIED use has 
presently ramped down in Mexico. 
However, gangsters in the U.S. have 
already employed bombings, and the 
future may make key U.S. cities or 
neighborhoods within those cities into 
contested plazas, transportation corridors, 
and distribution nodes. An awareness of 
VBIED potentials, TTPs, and response 
considerations is therefore prudent, in the 
border zone and enclaves upstream where 
cartel-gang interpenetration drives gang 
warfare. •
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